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THE LENDING-LIMIT COMBINATION RULES:
REGULATION BY ENFORCEMENT AT THE
OCC
DOUGLAS C. DREIER†
An agency cannot merely flit serendipitously from case to case,
like a bee buzzing from flower to flower, making up the rules as it goes
along.
1
– Judge Bruce M. Selya
ABSTRACT
The regulation-by-enforcement critique has made an impact at the
Securities and Exchange Commission, and scholars are beginning to
turn this critique against other agencies. Using this critique, this Note
demonstrates that the federal combination rules for the lending-limit
law should be rewritten. Under the lending-limit law, national
banking associations may lend only a certain percentage of their
unimpaired capital and unimpaired surplus to any one borrower.
Although the combination rules include several per se rules pursuant
to which loans made to two borrowers will be aggregated, they also
grant the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) the power
to determine ad hoc whether to aggregate two loans. This power to
determine on an ad hoc and even on a post hoc basis whether a
violation of the law has occurred is an affront to the rule of law and is
unfair to the industry. The combination rules should be amended to
remove the OCC’s power to make ad hoc determinations.

INTRODUCTION
2

3

In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, scholars, the media, and
legislators turned their focus to banking regulators and how they

Copyright © 2013 by Douglas C. Dreier.
† Duke University, J.D. and M.A. expected 2013; Cornell University, B.A. 2010. I am
grateful to Martin Werner for introducing me to this topic, to Deborah DeMott and Lawrence
Baxter for their feedback on earlier drafts of this Note, and to the Duke Law Journal editorial
staff.
1. Henry v. INS, 74 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1996).
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regulate the banking industry. As Comptroller of the Currency
Thomas Curry has explained, the “mission of ensuring the safety and
soundness of America’s national banks and federal savings
5
associations has never been more important or more challenging.”
This Note focuses on one of the ways in which the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) ensures the safety and soundness
of financial institutions—namely, by preventing financial institutions
6
from lending too much money to any one borrower. Because loans
made to two technically distinct borrowers may carry the same risk as
loans made to one borrower, the OCC has established combination
7
rules to define when two borrowers should be treated as one. As
explained in Part II, these combination rules do not inform banks
whether a given loan would exceed a bank’s capital requirements
because the OCC may aggregate loans to two borrowers whenever
8
“the facts and circumstances” warrant such action.
Political theory has long held the rule of law in high esteem.
9
Aristotle wrote that “the law must govern, and not individuals,” and
10
that “the rule of the law is preferable to that of any individual.”
When a rulemaker has the power to determine whether past conduct
violated some heretofore unstated law, the rule of law is rendered

2. See, e.g., Julie Andersen Hill, Bank Capital Regulation by Enforcement: An Empirical
Study, 87 IND. L.J. 645, 706 (2012) (discussing “the appropriate balance between capital
regulation by rule and capital regulation by enforcement”).
3. See, e.g., Binyamin Appelbaum, Dodd-Frank Backers Clash with Regulator, N.Y.
TIMES, July 23, 2011, at B1.
4. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of Sen. Jack Reed, Reed Urges a “Fundamental
Rethink” of Leadership at the OCC (June 22, 2011), available at http://reed.senate.gov/
press/release/reed-urges-a-fundamental-rethink-of-leadership-at-the-occ (expressing “extreme[]
concern[] about the lack of prudent leadership at the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency”).
5. Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Thomas J. Curry Takes
Office as the 30th Comptroller of the Currency (Apr. 9, 2012), available at http://www.occ.gov/
news-issuances/news-releases/2012/nr-occ-2012-58.html.
6. 12 U.S.C. § 84 (2006 & Supp. V 2012); see also 12 C.F.R. § 32.1(b) (2013) (establishing
that one of the purposes of regulations issued pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 84 is to “protect the safety
and soundness of national banks and savings associations by preventing excessive loans to one
person”).
7. 12 C.F.R. § 32.5.
8. See infra Part II.
9. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS bk. IV, at 160 (Benjamin Jowett trans., Clarendon Press ed.
1908) (c. 350 B.C.E.).
10. Id. bk. III, at 139.
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obsolete. An industry should be able to know what the law is by
examining the applicable laws and regulations. When the law is
unclear, it is unfair for an agency to hold people accountable for
violating that law.
This idea is at the heart of the regulation-by-enforcement
critique. Regulation by enforcement occurs when an agency creates a
piecemeal rule via enforcement actions or interpretive letters,
12
bypassing the normal rulemaking process. The regulation-byenforcement critique has historically been applied to the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), but in recent years scholars have
13
extended this critique to other agencies. This Note further extends
the regulation-by-enforcement critique to the OCC, an agency
14
historically less visible than the SEC, but no less important. Part I of
this Note describes the regulation-by-enforcement critique. Part II
explains the lending-limit law and the combination rules. Part III
explains why the OCC should not rely on regulation by enforcement
in the context of the combination rules.
The combination rules provide one particularly egregious
example of regulation by enforcement in the field of banking
regulation. With the combination rules, the OCC has established
multiple per se tests according to which the OCC will aggregate loans
made to two related borrowers, but the OCC has also granted itself
the discretion to determine whether to aggregate loans. This grant of
discretion undermines the purpose of having per se rules at all: there
is little point to having the per se rules if the OCC can aggregate loans
whenever it deems fit. A grant of this much discretion undermines

11. See Neil MacCormick, Natural Law and the Separation of Law and Morals, in
NATURAL LAW THEORY: CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS 105, 123 (Robert P. George ed., 1994)
(defining the rule of law as “treating people with formal fairness, that is, in a rational and
predictable way, setting public standards for citizens’ conduct and officials’ responses thereto,
standards by which one can judge one’s compliance or non-compliance, rather than leaving
everything to discretionary and potentially arbitrary decision”).
12. See infra Part I.
13. See infra Part I.A.
14. Compare Harvey L. Pitt & Karen L. Shapiro, Securities Regulation by Enforcement: A
Look Ahead at the Next Decade, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 149, 155 (1990) (“Unlike many of its sister
agencies, the SEC consistently has maintained a vigorous, highly-visible, and largely successful
enforcement profile.”), with COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT OF
THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION 66 (2006), available at http://
www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30Committee_Interim_ReportREV2.pdf (“By contrast [to the
SEC], bank regulators, concentrating on the ‘safety and soundness’ of the financial system, take
a prudential approach to supervision and generally do not broadly publicize their enforcement
actions.”).
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rule-of-law values. The OCC should amend its combination rules so
that the law is apparent from the text of the rules.
I. THE REGULATION-BY-ENFORCEMENT CRITIQUE
In creating law, agencies have three main options available to
them: formal rulemaking, notice-and-comment rulemaking, and
regulation by enforcement. Formal rulemaking is used, for instance,
15
in some food-additive and ratemaking proceedings. It is, however, a
16
“seldom used” option because it is triggered only when a statute
17
other than the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requires a rule
18
to be made on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing. In
contrast, notice-and-comment rulemaking occurs when an agency
19
makes a rule pursuant to the APA. The APA requires that agencies
(1) publish a notice of proposed rulemaking, (2) provide an
opportunity for public participation in the rulemaking by the
submission of written comments, and (3) publish a final rule and an
accompanying statement of basis and purpose not less than thirty
20
days before the rule’s effective date.
Notice-and-comment
21
rulemaking is the most common way that agencies establish rules.
Agencies sometimes bypass formal rulemaking and notice-andcomment rulemaking, opting instead for regulation by enforcement
and for making policy through enforcement actions and interpretive
22
letters. Regulation by enforcement occurs not when an agency issues

15. JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 5 (5th ed. 2012).
16. Id.
17. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2006).
18. LUBBERS, supra note 15, at 5.
19. Id.
20. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006). The APA imposes three general requirements on the
administrative process:
First, it requires that various governmental actions be publicized, or made available to
public scrutiny. . . . Second, the APA imposes various procedural requirements on
rulemaking and adjudication. . . . Third, the APA grants aggrieved parties the
opportunity to challenge agency action in court on the grounds that it violates the
Constitution or federal statutory law, including . . . the procedural requirements of
the APA.
Edward Rubin, It’s Time To Make the Administrative Process Administrative, 89 CORNELL L.
REV. 95, 100–01 (2003) (footnotes omitted).
21. LUBBERS, supra note 15, at 5.
22. James J. Park, The Competing Paradigms of Securities Regulation, 57 DUKE L.J. 625,
635–36 (2007). Interpretive letters are letters in which an agency responds to a request for
guidance on the applicability of a particular regulation. Donna M. Nagy, Judicial Reliance on
Regulatory Interpretations in SEC No-Action Letters: Current Problems and a Proposed
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an interpretive letter to clarify a vague rule, but rather when the
agency uses interpretive letters to create a rule that does not
23
otherwise exist. It is this use of interpretive letters which offends the
Aristotelian ideal of the rule of law.
A. Defining Regulation by Enforcement
Since at least 1982, the SEC has received criticism for bypassing
the rulemaking process and instead making policy through
24
enforcement actions and no-action letters —in other words, for
25
regulation by enforcement. Professor Roberta Karmel first
articulated the regulation-by-enforcement-critique in her influential
26
book, Regulation by Prosecution.
Professor Karmel, a former commissioner of the SEC, wrote
Regulation by Prosecution as “an act of self-justification, an effort to
explain why and how the relationship between government and
business—and more specifically, federal securities regulation—must
27
be changed.” Professor Karmel was “disturbed by the spectacle of a
government prosecutor failing to justify its policies and programs
28
under its enabling legislation.” She argued that the SEC had been
unnecessarily antagonistic toward business, pursuing certain cases
29
without adequate authority. Using examples such as SEC
enforcement actions against companies for paying bribes abroad, she
shows how the SEC has failed to lay out its rules so that those it has
taken enforcement actions against could know what those rules
30
were.

Framework, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 921, 937 (1998). For a discussion on the often blurred
distinction between interpretive letters and no-action letters, see id. at 937–38.
23. See Park, supra note 22, at 637 (“The ‘Regulation by Enforcement’ critique reflects a
general sense that norms are best initiated by rulemaking whereas enforcement actions should
merely enact previously defined rules.”).
24. See ROBERTA S. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION: THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION VS. CORPORATE AMERICA 95 (1982) (“The evils of combining
prosecutorial and adjudicative functions have been exacerbated by the [SEC’s] predilection for
formulating regulatory policy through the prosecution of enforcement cases.”).
25. See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text.
26. KARMEL, supra note 24.
27. Id. at 15.
28. Id. at 151.
29. Id. at 151–55. For a brief summary of Professor Karmel’s work, see Park, supra note 22,
at 635.
30. See KARMEL, supra note 24, at 155.
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Professor Karmel’s regulation-by-enforcement critique begins
with a simple assertion: “Lack of corporate accountability may be
troubling, but lack of accountability on the part of government is far
31
more dangerous.” But the SEC, instead of taking formal action to
create rules, has at times chosen to rely on case-by-case enforcement
32
actions to develop policy. For instance, in the 1970s the SEC sought
33
to encourage publicly held corporations to use independent auditors.
The SEC requested the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (AICPA) to take the position that independent auditors
needed to deal with a publicly held corporation through an audit
committee of independent directors, rather than through the
34
corporation’s full board of directors. When the AICPA refused to
do so, the SEC then brought enforcement actions against
corporations that had failed to implement such a policy, without first
35
proposing such a rule and without a congressional mandate. To
Professor Karmel, the SEC’s regulation by enforcement did not
square with the American value of governmental transparency. The
rule of law requires government agencies not to operate on a case-bycase basis.
Scholars have continued to level the regulation-by-enforcement
36
critique at the SEC. Historically, however, scholars have not
extended this critique to other agencies, perhaps because most
agencies have not maintained an enforcement profile as “vigorous,
37
highly-visible, and . . . successful” as has the SEC. But the SEC is not
unique. Like the SEC, the OCC and other banking regulators rely
38
“on a mix of regulation by rule and regulation by enforcement.” The
former Secretary of the Treasury, Timothy Geithner, showed his
willingness to rely on regulation by enforcement, arguing that “it is
imperative that regulatory capital requirements be able to adapt
quickly to innovation and to changes in accounting standards and

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 151.
Id. at 153.
Id. at 152–53.
Id. at 153.
Id.
See generally, e.g., Nagy, supra note 22; Park, supra note 22; Pitt & Shapiro, supra note

14.
37. Pitt & Shapiro, supra note 14, at 155.
38. Hill, supra note 2, at 707.
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39

other regulations.” The alternative, Secretary Geithner argued,
would “produce an ossified safety and soundness framework that is
unable to evolve to keep pace with change and to prevent regulatory
40
arbitrage.”
Two examples in which banking regulators rely on regulation by
enforcement are capital requirements and the lending-limit
combination rules. Professor Julie Andersen Hill has provided a
41
thorough discussion of the former, and this Note discusses the latter.
As Professor Hill explains, bank regulators have created ad hoc
capital requirements for the banks, and these requirements have not
42
been consistent from bank to bank or from regulator to regulator.
Capital is the difference between a bank’s assets and its deposits and
43
other liabilities. A bank’s capital divided by its total assets must
44
generally equal at least 4 percent. But the regulations governing
bank capital requirements provide significant discretion for regulators
45
to set capital requirements for each bank. For instance, the OCC’s
regulations provide that the factors to be considered in determining
46
capital requirements “vary in each case” and that the OCC may
consider the “overall condition, management strength, and future
47
prospects of the bank” in making that determination. The OCC has
used this discretion to require banks to hold much more capital than
48
what the 4 percent threshold would seem to require. By relying on
their discretionary power, bank regulators have foregone rulemaking,
which would have been “less costly, more transparent, and more
likely to consider macroeconomic concerns,” in their quest for greater
49
discretion. It may well be that bank regulators should require banks
39. Letter from Timothy F. Geithner, U.S. Sec’y of the Treasury, to Keith Ellison, U.S.
Representative (Jan. 11, 2010), available at http://ellison.house.gov/images/stories/Documents
/2010/01-11-10_Treasury_Letter.pdf.
40. Id.
41. Hill, supra note 2.
42. Id. at 648.
43. DARRYL E. GETTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42744, U.S. IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE BASEL CAPITAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 2 (2012).
44. RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL, JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE
LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 256 (4th ed. 2009).
45. Hill, supra note 2, at 656.
46. 12 C.F.R. § 3.11 (2013).
47. Id. § 3.11(c).
48. See Hill, supra note 2, at 648 (“Through discretionary capital increases implemented on
a bank-by-bank basis, bank regulators are creating ad hoc capital requirements that are, in some
cases, much higher than capital requirements published in regulations.”).
49. Id. at 708.
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to hold more capital as a policy matter because banks that hold more
50
capital are better able to withstand bank runs, but according to
Professor Hill, the regulators should do so openly and by means of a
51
clear rule.
Like its rules for capital requirements, the OCC’s combination
rules for the lending-limit law grant the OCC near limitless discretion
to determine when the loans made to two borrowers should be
52
aggregated and treated as if they were made to a single borrower.
Because the combination rules obscure when two borrowers qualify
as a single borrower, these rules obscure when a financial institution
violates Congress’s lending-limit law. A fuller discussion of these
rules appears in Part II.
B. Why Regulation by Enforcement is Objectionable
The critics of regulation by enforcement argue that it sidesteps
the rulemaking process, fails to take advantage of the expert input
that comes from the rulemaking process, and unfairly surprises
53
industry by failing to provide guidance regarding what is illegal. The
SEC has acknowledged that it “ha[s] been criticized for attempting to
‘make new law’ in an uncertain area by means of enforcement
54
action.” At times, the SEC has accepted the validity of this critique
and has opted instead to make policy through notice-and-comment
55
rulemaking. Yet regulation by enforcement is sometimes the only

50. See generally ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES:
WHAT’S WRONG WITH BANKING AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2013) (arguing that banks
should raise more capital and carry less debt). But see GETTER, supra note 43, at 7 (raising the
possibility that “[i]nvestors could possibly interpret a bank’s decision to raise capital as a sign
that its default or funding risks may be increasing,” which could lead investors to sell their stock
and ironically increase the risk of bank failure). For a review of ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra, see
John H. Cochrane, Running on Empty, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 2013, at C5.
51. Hill, supra note 2, at 706 (arguing that clear rulemaking “should be the preferred
method of setting capital requirements”).
52. See 12 C.F.R. § 32.5(c)(4) (stating that a common enterprise will be deemed to exist
“[w]hen the [OCC] determines, based upon an evaluation of the facts and circumstances of
particular transactions, that a common enterprise exists”).
53. Park, supra note 22, at 632.
54. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 7881, Exchange
Act Release No. 43,154, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,599, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716,
51,718 (Aug. 24, 2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, 249 (2012)).
55. Id.
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option available to the SEC, in which case this method may be
56
appropriate as a “last resort.”
By allowing an agency greater discretion, regulation by
57
enforcement may have certain advantages for the agency, but it adds
58
ambiguity to the law. All too often, as Professor Karmel and other
59
scholars have explained, the result of regulation by enforcement is
60
nothing but “confusion and distrust.” When rules are deficient,
agencies should change them and release new rules. They should not
short-circuit the rulemaking process by relying on enforcement
61
actions or interpretive letters. Regulation by enforcement is unfairly
62
63
surprising to industry. It may cause significant economic disruption.
And it sidesteps the administrative scheme and the benefits it
64
provides of expert input and deliberation. Although some degree of
65
uncertainty in the law is always to be expected, regulation by
enforcement takes this uncertainty to an extreme. As Professor

56. Pitt & Shapiro, supra note 14, at 167; see also id. (“In a proper context, an
administrative agency should define normative standards first, offer interpretive guidance
second (to the extent feasible), and compel obedience to those standards as a last resort, when it
is clear that those standards have been well publicized and comprehended, but disregarded.”).
57. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 2, at 694 (“The traditional justification for allowing regulators
discretion to adjust individual bank capital requirements is that mechanically determined
numerical capital requirements are insufficient to safeguard deposits in a dynamic and complex
banking industry.”).
58. Id. at 700.
59. See, e.g., KARMEL, supra note 24, at 95 (“[The SEC enforcement] program can be
attacked as creating uncertainty, leading to an unwarranted accretion of the SEC’s jurisdiction,
and discriminating unfairly against prosecutorial targets with interesting or novel violations.”);
James J. Park, Rules, Principles, and the Competition To Enforce the Securities Laws, 100 CALIF.
L. REV. 115, 152 (2012) (“[Critics] argued that principle-enforcement did not give the industry
enough notice as to what conduct was prohibited.”); Park, supra note 22, at 635–37
(“‘Regulation by Enforcement’ raises concerns in that ‘notions of due process require ample,
advance notification of precisely what types of conduct will be prohibited, before any person
may be civilly or criminally prosecuted for a violation of those standards.’” (quoting Pitt &
Shapiro, supra note 14, at 167)).
60. COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, supra note 14, at 66 (“When new standards
are introduced through specific enforcement actions and only later codified as explicit rules,
confusion and distrust are likely to be the consequences.”).
61. Id. at 67.
62. Park, supra note 22, at 632.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Cf. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972) (“Condemned to the use of
words, we can never expect mathematical certainty from our language.”).
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Karmel explains, it “transform[s]” an agency’s enforcement program
66
“into a policy-making and, therefore, highly political tool.”
By arguing that the regulation-by-enforcement critique applies to
banking regulators just as it applies to the SEC, this Note does not
deny that banks are, in certain aspects, fundamentally different from
other companies. As the Supreme Court has recognized, “[b]anking is
one of the longest regulated and most closely supervised of public
67
callings.” At least since the introduction of deposit insurance by the
68
Banking Act of 1933, banking regulators have had a vital role to play
69
in protecting the safety and soundness of banks. This special status
70
means that banks should indeed be subject to heavy regulation. But
71
heavy regulation can still come in the form of clear rules; it need not
come in the form of unfettered discretion.

66. KARMEL, supra note 24, at 336.
67. Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 250 (1947); see also Lawrence G. Baxter, Judicial
Responses to the Recent Enforcement Activities of the Federal Banking Regulators, 59 FORDHAM
L. REV. S193, S195–96 (1991) (describing the long history and relationship between banks and
regulators).
68. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C.). For a history of deposit insurance in America, see generally FED.
DEPOSIT INS. CORP., A BRIEF HISTORY OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES
(1998), available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/brief/brhist.pdf.
69. See Lawrence G. Baxter, The Rule of Too Much Law? The New Safety/Soundness
Rulemaking Responsibilities of the Federal Banking Agencies, 47 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 210,
211 (1993) (“From the very inception of the federal insurance system in 1933, safety and
soundness has been a principal concern driving a ‘cradle to grave’ regime of tight regulation; it is
a corollary of the federal insurance safety net upon which rests the constitutional and prudential
justification for federal regulation of even state chartered depository institutions (whenever
those institutions elect to become federally insured).” (citations omitted) (quoting People v.
Coast Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 98 F. Supp. 311, 316 (S.D. Cal. 1951))).
70. See Jonathan R. Macey, Commercial Banking and Democracy: The Illusive Quest for
Deregulation, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 2–3 (2006) (arguing that regulation of banks is necessary
“in heavy doses” because of banks’ special characteristics). For a critique of Professor Macey’s
article, see Peter J. Wallison, Banking Regulation’s Illusive Quest, 30 REGULATION, Spring 2007,
at 18.
71. Granted, heavy rule-based regulation will result in regulations that span page after
page. A proposed version of the Volcker Rule, for instance, covers 127 pages of the Federal
Register. See Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and
Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 76 Fed. Reg. 68,846, 68,846–68,972
(Nov. 7, 2011). The proposed Volcker Rule has continued to expand and, considering how many
exceptions it now contains, might not be the best example of heavy bank regulation. See Jesse
Eisinger, The Volcker Rule, Made Bloated and Weak N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK BLOG (Feb. 22,
2012, 12:04 PM) http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/02/22/the-volcker-rule-made-bloated-andweak (observing that the proposed Volcker Rule has become “a 530-page monstrosity of
hopeless complexity and vagueness”).
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Many scholars have enumerated regulation by enforcement’s
faults. This Note focuses on five specific criticisms of regulation by
72
enforcement levied by Professor Donna Nagy. First, regulation by
enforcement “produces a dearth of authoritative pronouncements on
73
which the public and, by extension, courts, can rely for guidance.”
After receiving an interpretive letter from the OCC, for instance, a
bank may know how the OCC will act toward it, but other banks do
not know how the OCC would act if presented with a slightly
different fact pattern.
Second, regulation by enforcement is “an inefficient method of
74
75
law making” that is “time-consuming and cumbersome.” For
instance, when capital requirements are established through
regulation by enforcement, as opposed to by clear statute or
regulation, banks cannot assess ex ante the amount of capital
76
necessary to satisfy their controlling statute or regulation. When
regulators set capital requirements through formal or informal
capital-enforcement actions, banks have a difficult time assessing the
amount of capital that their regulators might require. As Professor
Hill has explained, “[t]his can be costly not only for a bank receiving
77
an enforcement action, but also for the economy as a whole.”
Third, regulation by enforcement “increases the likelihood of
agency capture and special-interest decisionmaking,” given that an
interpretive letter is the result of a discussion between the regulator
78
and the individual regulated entity requesting the letter. The APA
states that an agency cannot adopt a rule until all regulated entities
and other interested parties have received notice and have had an
79
opportunity to comment. This broad participative process helps to
prevent the agency from overlooking any considerations that ought to
80
influence its opinion. The participative process leads to better rules
because it allows agencies to learn more about the subject of
regulation and because it helps offset any biases that may arise during

72. Nagy, supra note 22, at 957–61.
73. Id. at 957.
74. Id. at 958.
75. 1 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 19 (3d
ed. 1995).
76. Hill, supra note 2, at 700.
77. Id.
78. Nagy, supra note 22, at 959 (footnote omitted).
79. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c) (2006).
80. Park, supra note 22, at 665–66.
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the one-on-one discussion that occurs while preparing an interpretive
81
letter. Even though the participative process is not altogether
82
83
immune from these biases, it may weaken them.
Fourth, the piecemeal nature of interpretive letters “may lead to
regulatory interpretations that are inconsistent with each other or
84
with the broader statutory framework.” Courts have taken notice of
85
how inconsistent agency letters can be. Historically, inconsistencies
86
have riddled agency letters, and the problem of inconsistency
87
persists. The OCC is not immune to this problem, and it has faced
criticism for perceived inconsistencies between some of its
88
interpretive letters in the past.
Lastly, an agency’s reliance on interpretive letters “contravenes
the spirit, and arguably the letter, of the APA’s notice and comment
89
provisions.” Although the APA exempts “interpretive rules and
90
statements of policy” from the notice-and-comment requirement, an
agency should not misuse this exemption “to accomplish indirectly
81. Michael Asimow, Public Participation in the Adoption of Interpretive Rules and Policy
Statements, 75 MICH. L. REV. 520, 574 (1977).
82. See, e.g., Kimberly D. Krawiec, Don’t “Screw Joe the Plummer”: The Sausage-Making
of Financial Reform, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 8), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1925431 (“[T]he powerful interest groups
most affected by Dodd-Frank did not waste the opportunities provided by the Volcker Rule’s
gaps and ambiguities. Instead, as evidenced by both public comment letters and meeting logs,
they actively lobbied agencies to adopt favorable definitions, interpretations, and
exemptions . . . .”).
83. See Nagy, supra note 22, at 959 (contrasting the public comment process with
“policymaking through the no-action letter process,” which “substantially increases the
likelihood of agency capture”).
84. Id. at 960.
85. See Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps. v. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 462 F.3d 121, 123
(2d Cir. 2006) (“[T]he group within the SEC that handles investor disclosure matters and issues
no-action letters[] continued to apply this interpretation consistently for fifteen years until 1990,
when it began applying a different interpretation, although at first in an ad hoc and inconsistent
manner.” (footnote omitted)).
86. See generally Lewis D. Lowenfels, SEC No-Action Letters: Conflicts with Existing
Statutes, Cases, and Commission Releases, 59 VA. L. REV. 303 (1973) (discussing how SEC noaction letters have caused inconsistencies in a number of fields).
87. See Kab Lae Kim, A Study on Rule 145 of the Securities Act of 1933: How To Provide
Clarity and Predictability in Rule 145 Transactions, 40 AKRON L. REV. 131, 169 (2007) (deriding
the “excessive and inconsistent ‘no-action letters’” issued by the SEC on Rule 145, 17
C.F.R. § 230.145 (2006)).
88. See, e.g., Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., OCC Interpretive Letter, 1988 OCC Ltr.
LEXIS 266, at *48–50 (Aug. 8, 1988) (defending against the criticism that its “[d]ecision is
inconsistent with previous OCC statements”); see also infra text accompanying note 104.
89. Nagy, supra note 22, at 960.
90. 5 U.S.C. § 553(d) (2006).
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what the APA forbids it to accomplish directly” by “announc[ing] in
no-action letters what are, in effect, new regulatory requirements or
obligations without providing prior notice or the opportunity for
91
public comments.”
Because of the harm caused by regulation by enforcement, an
agency should rely on regulation by enforcement only “as a last
92
resort.” Unfortunately, as is explained in Part II, the OCC has not
evidenced this restraint in crafting its combination rules.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE COMBINATION RULES
The OCC is a bureau located within the Department of the
93
94
Treasury. It is one of three—formerly four —agencies in charge of
95
regulating the financial industry. Its purpose is to “assur[e] the safety
and soundness of, and compliance with laws and regulations, fair
access to financial services, and fair treatment of customers by, the
96
institutions and other persons subject to its jurisdiction.” In addition
97
to overall capital requirements, banks also have separate risklowering lending limitations, which cap the amount of capital that a
98
bank can lend to any single borrower. Since the enactment of the
99
first federal lending-limit law during the Civil War, the law
100
governing lending limits has undergone significant changes. As
91. Nagy, supra note 22, at 962 (criticizing SEC regulation by enforcement via no-action
letters).
92. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
93. 12 U.S.C. § 1(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2012).
94. The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) previously supervised federally insured savings
banks and thrifts. Functions and Responsibilities of the Director of the Office of Thrift
Supervision, 12 C.F.R. § 500.1 (2009). The OTS’s role in the financial crisis led to it being
labeled “the worst federal regulator on the block.” Mary Kane, Agency at Forefront of Mortgage
Crisis Making a Comeback, WASH. INDEP. (Jan. 9, 2009), http://washingtonindependent.com/
24782/insurance-firms-aim-for-tarp-money-less-oversight (quoting Professor Patricia McCoy).
In response, Congress eliminated the OTS. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 25–26 (2010).
95. Hill, supra note 2, at 650.
96. 12 U.S.C. § 1(a).
97. See supra Part I.A.
98. 12 U.S.C. § 84 (2006 & Supp. V 2012).
99. Currency Act, § 47, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665, 679 (1863) (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. § 84); see also Donald E. Frechette, National Bank Lending Limits and the Attribution
Rules of 12 U.S.C. § 84: Congress and the Comptroller Cover the Bases, 2 U. MIAMI BUS. L.J. 1,
2–4 (1991) (describing the history of the federal lending-limit law).
100. Compare Currency Act § 47, 12 Stat at 679 (mandating that “the total liabilities of any
person, or of any company or firm . . . shall at no time exceed one third . . . of the amount of the
capital stock”), with 12 U.S.C. § 84(a)(1) (prohibiting loans to a single borrower from
“exceed[ing] 15 per centum of the [bank’s] unimpaired capital and unimpaired surplus”).
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World War I drew to a close in 1918, Congress amended the federal
lending-limit law by empowering the comptroller of the currency to
develop rules regulating lending limits and to determine when loans
made to two borrowers should be treated as if they were made to a
101
single borrower.
Originally, the comptroller of the currency exercised this power
102
by means of “general rules.” These general rules evolved and
gained some degree of specificity via administrative practice and
interpretive letters, but they evolved on a case-by-case basis, without
103
the benefit of further written rules. The OCC eventually recognized
that the combination rules were “inconsistently applied” and “overly
104
The 1982 passage of the Garn-St. Germain
complicated.”
105
Depository Institutions Act finally propelled the OCC to delineate
its combination rules more clearly. At the time, the OCC stated that it
needed to provide clear combination rules and that the alternative—
the combination of loans on a post hoc basis—was “wholly
106
undesirable.” The OCC noted two reasons why this alternative was
so undesirable. First, “if combination of loans were to be done only
on a post hoc basis, banks would have little, if any, certainty as to how
to operate to avoid violations of Section 84 and the attendant
107
possibility of directors’ liability.” Second, “[t]he [OCC], in turn,
would find itself faced with an endless stream of requests for opinion
letters from banks wishing to operate cautiously; examiners would be
equally overburdened in their attempts to judge each set of
108
circumstances on its facts.” Unfortunately, the OCC has stopped
short in its commitment to clear rules.

101. Supplement to Second Liberty Bond Act, § 6, ch. 176, 40 Stat. 965, 967 (1918).
102. National Bank Lending Limits, 47 Fed. Reg. 56,862, 56,863 (Dec. 21, 1982) (codified in
scattered sections of 12 C.F.R.).
103. National Bank Lending Limits, 48 Fed. Reg. 15,844, 15,846 (Apr. 12, 1983) (codified in
scattered sections of 12 C.F.R.). An “interpretive letter” in the OCC context is the same as a
“no-action letter” in the SEC context. See Joshua E. Broaded, A Survey of Regulations
Applicable to Investment Advisers, 12 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 27, 31 (2009) (“These public letters, which
are often called ‘no-action letters’ or ‘interpretive letters,’ can then be considered by
other[s] . . . grappling with similar questions.”).
104. National Bank Lending Limits, 48 Fed. Reg. at 15,846.
105. Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat
1469, (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
106. National Bank Lending Limits, 48 Fed. Reg. at 15,846.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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A. The Current Law
Section 84 of Title 12 of the United States Code sets the federal
lending limit for national banks. A national bank is a bank chartered
109
under federal, not state, law. A national bank may not loan more
than 15 percent of its unimpaired capital and unimpaired surplus to
any one borrower, if not fully secured by collateral with a market
110
value at least equal to the amount of the loan. A national bank may,
however, issue an additional fully secured loan to a maxed-out
borrower if the loan does not exceed 10 percent of the bank’s
111
unimpaired capital and unimpaired surplus. The law also authorizes
the OCC to adopt rules governing “when a loan putatively made to a
person shall for purposes of this section be attributed to another
112
person.”
Section 32.5 of Title 12 of the Code of Federal Regulations,
adopted pursuant to Section 84, prescribes that two borrowers will be
combined and deemed to be one borrower “[w]hen proceeds of a
loan . . . are to be used for the direct benefit of the other
person . . . or . . . [w]hen a common enterprise is deemed to exist
113
between the persons.” It also contains specialized rules for the
114
aggregation of loans (1) to a “corporate group”; (2) to foreign
115
governments, their agencies, and their instrumentalities; and (3) to
116
partnerships, joint ventures, and associations.

109. Eliot C. Schaefer, Comment, The Credit Card Act of 2009 Was Not Enough: A National
Usury Rate Would Provide Consumers with the Protection They Need, 41 U. BALT. L. REV. 741,
747 n.65 (2012).
110. 12 U.S.C. § 84(a)(1) (2006).
111. Id. § 84(a)(2).
112. Id. § 84(d)(2).
113. 12 C.F.R. § 32.5(a) (2013).
114. Id. § 32.5(d)(1). A loan to a corporate group may not exceed 50 percent of a bank’s
capital and surplus. Id. A “corporate group” is defined as “a person and all of its subsidiaries,”
and a person’s “subsidiary” is defined as a corporation or a limited liability company for which
the person “owns or beneficially owns directly or indirectly more than 50 percent of [its] voting
securities or voting interests.” Id.
115. Id. § 32.5(f). Loans to foreign governments, their agencies, and their instrumentalities
are aggregated with one another only if the loans fail to satisfy one of two tests: either (1) “the
borrower has resources or revenue of its own sufficient to service” the loan, or (2) the purpose
of the loan “is consistent with the purposes of the borrower's general business.” Id. § 32.5(f)(1).
116. Id. § 32.5(e). A loan to a partnership, joint venture, or association is deemed to be a
loan to each member of the partnership, joint venture, or association so long as the member is
liable for the loan, but a loan to a member of a partnership, joint venture, or association is not
attributed to the partnership, joint venture, or association unless the loan satisfies the directbenefit or common-enterprise test. Id.
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Section 32.5 attempts to provide further guidance by defining
117
what constitutes a “direct benefit” or a “common enterprise.”
Under the direct-benefit test, the proceeds of a loan will be attributed
to another person “when the proceeds, or assets purchased with the
proceeds, are transferred to another person, other than in a bona fide
118
arm’s length transaction.” One example of the OCC’s reliance on
the direct-benefit test arises from the OCC’s enforcement action
119
against Texas National Bank. The bank issued loans to (1) a
wealthy individual with an estimated net worth of several hundred
million dollars, (2) his spouse, (3) twenty corporations owned by the
120
family, and (4) their children. The family created the twenty
corporations to hold shopping-center properties that the family
121
already personally owned. The purported purpose of the loans to
the corporations was to finance the borrowers’ “purchases” of the
122
shopping-center properties. After the so-called purchases, proceeds
of the loans were either paid in cash to the family or were “used to
123
pay off any outstanding mortgages on the properties transferred.”
Subsequently, the children received a majority interest in each of the
124
twenty corporations. Thus, “the entire matter was motivated by
125
estate planning considerations.” Because the proceeds of the loans
were used for “an intra-family restructuring of assets,” rather than for
a “bona fide commercial transaction,” the loans were all for the direct
126
benefit of the family; therefore, the OCC aggregated the loans.
The direct-benefit test is not the only test at the OCC’s disposal.
The common-enterprise tests allow the OCC to aggregate loans when
the connection between the borrowers is less direct. The OCC’s
regulations include three per se common-enterprise tests and one
127
catch-all test. Unlike the catch-all test, the regulation’s three per se

117. Id. § 32.5(b)–(c).
118. Id. § 32.5(b).
119. Tex. Nat’l Bank Baytown, Tex., No. OCC-AA-EC-92-88, 1994 OCC Enf. Dec. LEXIS
272 (Apr. 20, 1994).
120. Id. at *4–5.
121. Id.
122. Id. at *5–6.
123. Id. at *6.
124. Id. at *10.
125. Id. at *11–12.
126. Id. at *12.
127. See 12 C.F.R. § 32.5(c) (2013).
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common-enterprise tests provide guidance to national banks trying to
abide by the lending-limit law.
The first per se common-enterprise test declares a common
enterprise to exist when the expected source of repayment for two
loans “is the same for each borrower and neither borrower has
another source of income from which the loan . . . may be fully
128
repaid.” For instance, Corporation A and Corporation B both have
129
loans from the same bank. Corporation A derives all of its income
from the production of sausage, and each year it sells all of its sausage
to Corporation B. In turn, the income of corporation B is 100 percent
derived from the retail marketing of Corporation A’s sausage;
Corporation B does not receive any sausage from any other
corporation. The expected source of repayment for both loans is
effectively the same, and neither borrower has another source of
income with which to repay the loans; therefore, the loans are for a
130
common enterprise, and the OCC would aggregate them.
The second per se common-enterprise test declares a common
enterprise to exist when loans are made “[t]o borrowers who are
related directly or indirectly through common control,” provided that
“50 percent or more of one borrower’s gross receipts or gross
expenditures . . . are derived from transactions with the other
131
borrower.” For instance, a bank makes loans both to a Subchapter S
132
corporation and to the 100 percent owner of that corporation.
Seventy-two percent of the owner’s gross receipts come from that
133
corporation. Pursuant to the second per se common-enterprise test,
the owner and the corporation are related through common control,
and substantial financial interdependence exists between them;
134
therefore, the OCC would aggregate these loans.
The third per se test declares a common enterprise to exist when
the borrowers’ purpose in obtaining the loans is “to acquire a
128. Id. § 32.5(c)(1).
129. The example used here is based on an example in the Missouri Code of State
Regulations. See MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 20, § 1140-2.080(3)(A) (2013).
130. See 12 C.F.R. § 32.5(c)(1) (deeming a common enterprise to exist “[w]hen the expected
source of repayment for each loan or extension of credit is the same for each borrower and
neither borrower has another source of income from which the loan (together with the
borrower’s other obligations) may be fully repaid”).
131. Id. § 32.5(c)(2).
132. [Redacted], OCC Interpretive Letter No. 938, O.C.C. Q.J., Dec. 2002, at 31, 33 (Jan. 18,
2001).
133. Id. at 33 n.10.
134. Id. at 32–33 (citing 12 C.F.R. § 32.5(c)(2) (2000)).
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business enterprise of which those borrowers will own more than 50
135
percent of the voting securities or voting interests.” For instance, a
bank makes loans to six individual borrowers, each of whom uses the
136
loans to invest in a new limited liability company. Combined, the six
borrowers hold 100 percent of the membership interests in that
137
company.
Even if each borrower were a longstanding bank
customer with significant net worth, the OCC would aggregate the
loans pursuant to the third per se common-enterprise test because all
loan proceeds were used “to invest in and acquire more than 50
138
percent of a business enterprise.”
In contrast to these per se common-enterprise tests, the OCC has
promulgated a catch-all test. The OCC deems a common enterprise to
exist “[w]hen [it] determines, based upon an evaluation of the facts
and circumstances of particular transactions, that a common
139
enterprise exists.” The presence of this unfettered discretion should
cause concern to any bank that is trying to decipher the OCC’s rules.
To determine whether the OCC will aggregate certain loans pursuant
to the catch-all provision, banks have no other option but to spend
time and money requesting an interpretive letter from the OCC,
which the OCC has acknowledged may flood the OCC “with an
endless stream of requests for opinion letters” regarding the scope of
140
the catch-all test.
The OCC has cited thirteen factors as having some bearing on
whether the OCC will determine that a common enterprise exists, but
it has not attempted to establish any additional per se rules based on
these factors. These thirteen factors are as follows:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

engaging in supporting lines of business;
interchange of goods and services;
common ownership of assets;
common management;
use of common facilities;
commingling of assets and liabilities;

135. 12 C.F.R. § 32.5(c)(3) (2012).
136. [Redacted] Nat’l Bank, OCC Interpretive Letter No. 863, O.C.C. Q.J., Dec. 1999, at 49,
49 (July 22, 1999).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 4.
139. 12 C.F.R. § 32.5(c)(4).
140. National Bank Lending Limits, 48 Fed. Reg. 15,844, 15,846 (Apr. 12, 1983) (codified in
scattered sections of 12 C.F.R.).

DREIER IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

LENDING-LIMIT COMBINATION RULES

4/15/2013 1:23 PM

1765

(7) closely related business activities;
(8) similarity in structure, financing and holding;
(9) use of same business address;
(10)centralized cash management program;
(11)likelihood that a financially troubled member of the group
would receive financial aid from other members of the group;
(12)family relationships among the borrowers; and
141
(13)pledging of assets to support another person’s loans.
The OCC has provided no guidance as to how these thirteen factors
are to be weighed against one another, or how many factors are
required to warrant combination.
142
Notwithstanding its pro-industry reputation, the OCC has
expressed its willingness to rely on the facts-and-circumstances
143
provision of the combination rules, which grants the OCC the
144
authority to deem a common enterprise to exist ad hoc. In an
interpretive letter, the OCC has explicitly rebuked the notion that
145
this provision is “merely a prefatory statement.” The OCC has
recognized the concern about “the extent to which this regulation
grants to examiners discretion to judge when a common enterprise
146
exists.” It has rejected the notion “that the facts and circumstances
provision must be directly, substantially, and demonstrably tied to the
three per se tests which follow,” even if “otherwise the provision
becomes an ambiguous standard that can only be applied on a post
147
hoc basis during the examination process.”
The facts and
148
circumstances provision “is indeed a stand alone provision,” and,

141. [Redacted], OCC Interpretive Letter No. 938, O.C.C. Q.J., Dec. 2002, at 31, 33 (Jan. 18,
2001); accord [Redacted], OCC Interpretive Letter No. 925, O.C.C. Q.J., June 2002, at 65, 66
(Apr. 12, 2001).
142. See Elizabeth Warren, Redesigning Regulation: A Case Study from the Consumer Credit
Market, in GOVERNMENT AND MARKETS: TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF REGULATION 391, 410
(Edward J. Balleisen & David A. Moss eds., 2010) (“But the[] main mission [of the OCC and
other banking regulators] is to protect the financial stability of banks and other financial
institutions, not to protect consumers. As a result, they focus intently on bank profitability and
the maintenance of sufficient capital reserves relative to outstanding loans, and far less on the
financial impact that many of the products sold by the banks will have on consumers.”).
143. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
144. 12 C.F.R. § 32.5(c)(4).
145. [Redacted], OCC Interpretive Letter No. 563, 11-1 O.C.C. Q.J., Mar. 1992, at 71, 71
(Sept. 6, 1991).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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with it, the OCC has “reserve[d] the ability to attribute loans under
the general rule even when none of the specific rules is directly
149
applicable.”
The OCC “believe[s] that instances where the facts and
circumstances test will apply to the exclusion of the per se rules will
150
be rare.” But this may not always be the case. Considering the
increasing negative press against the OCC in the wake of the 2008
151
recession, the OCC’s moderation might not continue. Senators Jack
Reed and Carl Levin have advocated for President Obama “to
fundamentally re-think the OCC’s leadership” after comments by
John Walsh, the former acting comptroller of the currency, that
152
warned against the danger of excessive financial regulation.
To determine whether the OCC will aggregate certain loans
pursuant to the catch-all provision, banks may write to the OCC and
153
request an interpretive letter. The ability to request an interpretive
letter and inquire into whether the OCC will aggregate loans to two
borrowers mitigates the sympathy that a court or the public may have
for a bank that falls victim to the regulation’s facts-and-circumstances
154
provision. Nevertheless, the regulation-by-enforcement critique,
which argues that agencies should establish readily understandable
per se rules, counsels against the OCC’s reliance on interpretive
155
letters if the law could be made clear without them.

149. Id. at 72 (quoting National Bank Lending Limit, 54 Fed. Reg. 43,398, 43,402 (Oct. 24,
1989) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7, 32)).
150. Id. at 73.
151. See, e.g., Appelbaum, supra note 3 (“‘The O.C.C. is acting as if there was never a
financial crisis,’ said Dennis Kelleher, president of Better Markets, a nonprofit group that
advocates for increased regulation of the financial industry. ‘It’s just an utterly indefensible
abdication of its responsibility to the American people.’”).
152. Press Release, Office of Sen. Jack Reed, supra note 4; see also John Walsh,
Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks Before the Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation
(June 21, 2011), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/speeches/2011/pub-speech2011-78.pdf (advocating for “caution regarding the cumulative effects” of increased banking
regulation).
153. Cf. National Bank Lending Limits, 48 Fed. Reg. 15,844, 15,846 (Apr. 12, 1983) (codified
in scattered sections of 12 C.F.R.) (noting that cautious banks may flood the OCC “with an
endless stream of requests for opinion letters” regarding the scope of § 32.5).
154. See Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982)
(“[E]conomic regulation is subject to a less strict vagueness test because [inter alia] . . . the
regulated enterprise may have the ability to clarify the meaning of the regulation by its own
inquiry . . . .”).
155. See supra Part I.
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Even the OCC has recognized that the combination rules would
ideally consist of per se rules: when amending the combination rules,
the OCC has attempted to “set[] forth clear rules which were
internally consistent and were logical from both a legal and financial
156
perspective.”
For instance, in 1995, the OCC amended the
combination rules to remove a second facts-and-circumstances catch157
all provision from the direct-benefit test. In making this change, the
OCC declared that its purpose was “to improve certainty regarding
158
the application of the test.” Thus, despite maintaining the facts-and159
circumstances provision of the common-enterprise test, the OCC
conceded the desirability of crafting clear combination rules.
Following the federal government’s lead, many states have
enacted statutes or regulations that mirror the federal scheme and
that permit their states’ banking regulators to make similar ad hoc
160
determinations. Despite the pervasive mimicry of the federal

156. National Bank Lending Limits, 48 Fed. Reg. at 15,846.
157. Lending Limits, 60 Fed. Reg. (Feb. 15, 1995) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 32).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36a-262(b)(4) (West 2011) (aggregating loans
“[w]hen the commissioner determines, based upon an evaluation of the facts and circumstances
of particular transactions, that a common enterprise exists”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 26705(5)(b)(iv) (Supp. 2012) (aggregating loans “[w]hen the director determines, based upon an
evaluation of the facts and circumstances of particular transactions, that a common enterprise
exists”); IOWA CODE § 524.904(6)(e) (2011) (aggregating loans “[w]hen the superintendent
determines the interests of a group of more than one borrower, or any combination of the
members of the group, are so interrelated that they should be considered a unit”); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 9-1104(f)(6) (2001) (“[T]he commissioner may determine, based upon an evaluation of
the facts and circumstances of a particular transaction, that a loan to one borrower may be
attributed to another borrower.”); COLO. CODE REGS. § 701-101.64(H)(3)(d) (2013)
(aggregating loans when “[t]he Banking Board determines, based upon an evaluation of the
facts and circumstances of particular transactions, that a common enterprise exists”); GA.
COMP. R. & REGS. 80-1-5.11(3)(d) (2012) (aggregating loans when “the Department
determines, based upon an evaluation of the facts and circumstances of particular transactions,
that a common enterprise exi[s]ts”); NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 662.008(3)(b)(3) (2011) (aggregating
loans when “[a]ny other circumstances exist which indicate that one or more persons acting in
concert directly or indirectly exercises a controlling influence over the management of policies
of another person”); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 3, § 77.3 (2013) (authorizing “the
Banking Department [to] criticize such undue concentration of credit [among multiple
borrowers] and [to] take such other supervisory action with respect thereto as may be deemed
necessary or appropriate,” even if a bank’s loans do not otherwise fall within the regulation’s
combination rules); OHIO ADMIN. CODE 1301:1-3-01(D)(3)(d) (2013) (aggregating loans when
“the superintendent determines, based upon an evaluation of the facts and circumstances or
particular transactions, that a common enterprise exists”); OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 85:10-1110(b)(2)(A) (2012) (noting that “[w]hether two or more persons are engaged in a ‘common
enterprise’ will depend upon a realistic evaluation of the facts and circumstances of particular
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scheme, some states, including Delaware, Alaska, and Montana, have
refrained from granting an agency the ability to make ad hoc
determinations, choosing instead to use only per se rules to determine
161
whether to aggregate certain loans for state banks. In these states,
state banks can turn to the respective combination rules and
understand them without needing to request an interpretive letter.
Interestingly, these three states—Delaware, Alaska, and
Montana—have not suffered a single bank failure between October 1,
2000 (when the FDIC’s data begins) and April 5, 2013, although more
than five hundred banks in other states have failed during this
162
period. Although the successes of these states cannot be attributed
to their clearly delineated per se combination rules, they do provide
evidence that regulation by enforcement is not a categorical necessity
for combination rules. The OCC should learn from these states, which
serve as “social laboratories” from which other states and the federal
163
government might learn.
B. The Penalty for a Violation
Violating the lending-limit law may lead to a substantial penalty,
and, under the facts-and-circumstances provision, a person may
violate the law unknowingly. The federal lending-limit law conditions
punishment on the commission of a knowing violation of the law,

transactions”); OR. ADMIN. R. 441-505-3080(4) (2013) (aggregating loans when “the Director
determines, based upon an evaluation of the facts and circumstances of particular transactions,
that a common enterprise exists”); 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 12.9(a)(4) (2012) (aggregating loans
when “the banking commissioner determines that a loan should be attributed to another
person”); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 208-512-260(2) (2013) (noting that “whether a ‘common
enterprise’ exists depends upon a realistic evaluation of the facts and circumstances of the
particular transaction”); W. VA. CODE R. § 106-9-4.2(a) (2013) (noting that “[w]hether
two . . . or more persons are engaged in a common enterprise depends upon a realistic
evaluation of the facts and circumstances of particular transactions”).
161. See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 5, § 909(c) (2001) (excluding any mention of “common
enterprise”); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § 02.125(c) (2008) (roughly tracking 12 C.F.R. § 32.5
but not including a “facts and circumstances” provision); MONT. ADMIN. R. 2.59.108 (2013)
(largely replicating 12 C.F.R. § 32.5 but not including a “facts and circumstances” provision).
162. See Failed Bank List, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. (Apr. 5, 2013), http://www.fdic.gov/
bank/individual/failed/banklist.html. Faring equally well were Maine, North Dakota, Rhode
Island, and Vermont. See id. The relatively small populations of these seven states may in part
explain why these states had no bank failures.
163. See, e.g., Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 579 (1981) (“It is one of the happy incidents
of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country.” (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting))).
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thereby protecting directors who negligently violate the law. Yet the
word “knowingly” does not excuse a defendant who knowingly
engages in certain conduct but who is ignorant that the law prohibits
165
166
such conduct. A legal mistake is generally irrelevant to the courts.
Although some states have written a fair-notice requirement into
167
their respective lending-limit laws or regulations, the federal scheme
168
does not require fair notice. Granted, courts may nevertheless read
the OCC’s regulations to contain a fair-notice requirement, as they
169
170
have in other contexts. However, courts rarely do so. Therefore, if
164. 12 U.S.C. § 93(a) (2006). The Supreme Court has discussed in detail the mens rea
requirement for a lending-limit violation:
[I]t must appear not only that the liabilities of a person, company, firm, etc., to the
[b]ank for money borrowed were permitted to exceed the prescribed limit, but that
[the bank director] . . . participated in or assented to the excessive loan or loans not
through mere negligence but knowingly and in effect intentionally, with this
qualification, that if he deliberately refrained from investigating that which it was his
duty to investigate, any resulting violation of the statute must be regarded as “in
effect intentional.”
Corsicana Nat’l Bank of Corsicana v. Johnson, 251 U.S. 68, 71–72 (1919) (quoting Yates v.
Jones Nat’l Bank, 206 U.S. 158, 180 (1907)) (applying the law that preceded 12 U.S.C. § 84 (2006
& Supp. V 2012)).
165. See, e.g., Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 123–24 (1974) (“To require proof of a
defendant’s knowledge of the legal status of the [conduct committed] would permit the
defendant to avoid prosecution by simply claiming that he had not brushed up on the law. Such
a formulation of the scienter requirement is [not] required . . . .”).
166. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 264 (4th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he government
need prove only that the defendant knew the operative facts which make his action illegal. The
government need not prove that the defendants understood the legal consequences of those
facts or were even aware of the existence of the law granting them significance.”); see also 21
AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 137 (2011) (“[I]t is a deeply rooted common-law principle that
ignorance or mistake of law provides no defense or excuse for a crime.”).
167. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 524.904(6)(e) (2011) (giving banks an opportunity to cure a
violation of the Iowa lending-limit law after Iowa’s superintendent of banking has deemed a
violation to exist); MINN. STAT. § 48.24(8) (2012 & Supp. 2013) (requiring a willful violation, as
opposed to a knowing violation, before an officer or employee of the bank becomes “personally
liable to the bank for the amount of the loan in excess of the statutory limit”); OKLA. ADMIN.
CODE § 85:10-11-10(d)(7) (2012) (giving banks an opportunity to cure an “inadvertent”
violation).
168. 12 U.S.C. § 93 (2006).
169. See, e.g., Beaver Plant Operations, Inc. v. Herman, 223 F.3d 25, 31 (1st Cir. 2000)
(establishing that in the absence of a clearly articulated standard, the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) could not demonstrate a violation without showing “fair notice
of its interpretation of the cited standard”); Upton v. SEC, 75 F.3d 92, 98 (2d Cir. 1996)
(explaining that the court would violate due process by deferring to the SEC’s interpretation of
its own rules if “doing so would penalize an individual who has not received fair notice of a
regulatory violation”); Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324, 1333–34 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding,
in light of unclear EPA policies, that “where the agency itself struggles to provide a definitive
reading of the regulatory requirements, a regulated party is not ‘on notice’ of the agency’s
ultimate interpretation of the regulations, and may not be punished”); Phelps Dodge Corp. v.
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the OCC exercises its right under the combination rules to decide ad
hoc that it will aggregate two loans, then a bank and its directors may
violate the lending-limit law, even if they had no reason to know that
the OCC would aggregate the two loans.
The penalty for a knowing violation of the federal lending-limit
law may include the forfeiture of “all the rights, privileges, and
171
franchises of the [national banking] association.” For example, after
the directors of a California bank exceeded that bank’s lending limit
and attempted to game the combination rules, the OCC issued an
order “prohibiting [them] from further participation in the banking
172
industry.” In addition, the order stated that every director of a bank
“who participated in or assented to [a violation] shall be held liable in
his personal and individual capacity for all damages which the
association, its shareholders, or any other person, shall have sustained
173
in consequence of such violation.” After another California bank
exceeded its lending limit, its directors were held personally liable for
the difference between the bank’s actual lending limit and the amount
174
of money it lost on its defaulted, excessive loans. A civil penalty, in
certain situations, may also be assessed against an infracting bank in

Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 681 F.2d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that
unclear Mine Safety and Health Review Commission regulations cannot form the basis of civil
and criminal penalties); Kent Nowlin Constr. Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm’n, 593 F.2d 368, 371 (10th Cir. 1979) (explaining that “an employer is not required to
assume the burden of guessing what the Secretary [of OSHA] intended the safety regulations to
mean”); Diebold, Inc. v. Marshall, 585 F.2d 1327, 1335 (6th Cir. 1978) (identifying “adequate
warning of what [statutes and regulations] command or forbid” as “fundamental” to due
process); Diamond Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 528 F.2d
645, 650 (5th Cir. 1976) (refusing to construe regulations liberally and noting that “the Secretary
[of OSHA] has the responsibility to state with ascertainable certainty what is meant by the
standards he has promulgated”).
170. Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982)
(“The degree of vagueness that the Constitution tolerates—as well as the relative importance of
fair notice and fair enforcement—depends in part on the nature of the enactment. Thus,
economic regulation is subject to a less strict vagueness test because its subject matter is often
more narrow, and because businesses, which face economic demands to plan behavior carefully,
can be expected to consult relevant legislation in advance of action. Indeed, the regulated
enterprise may have the ability to clarify the meaning of the regulation by its own inquiry, or by
resort to an administrative process.” (footnotes omitted)); see also John F. Manning,
Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 612, 670–71 n.282 (1996) (“[T]he [Supreme] Court has never held that an
agency interpretation of a regulation was invalid because of a lack of fair notice.”).
171. 12 U.S.C. § 93(a) (2006).
172. Ulrich, No. AA-EC-00-40, 2003 OCC Ltr. LEXIS 82, at *77–78 (Jan. 31, 2003).
173. 12 U.S.C. § 93(a).
174. Del Junco v. Conover, 682 F.2d 1338, 1342–43 (9th Cir. 1982).

DREIER IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

LENDING-LIMIT COMBINATION RULES

4/15/2013 1:23 PM

1771

an amount up to $1,000,000, although more modest civil penalties are
175
usually assessed. For instance, the OCC assessed a penalty of only
$5,000 against the president of a Texas bank after that bank exceeded
176
its lending limit by over $1 million. The OCC has assessed penalties
177
as high as $100,000. Thus, the penalties for a violation of the
lending-limit law may be substantial, and, under the facts-andcircumstances provision, a person may violate the law even though no
per se rule proscribes the person’s conduct.
III. APPLYING THE REGULATION-BY-ENFORCEMENT CRITIQUE TO
THE OCC’S COMBINATION RULES
In light of these stiff penalties, the regulation-by-enforcement
critique weighs particularly heavy on the combination rules. Thus,
before applying the regulation-by-enforcement critique, it is crucial to
understand why the OCC would use regulation by enforcement in this
context. This Part explains why the OCC has rejected the notion “that
the facts and circumstances provision must be directly, substantially,
and demonstrably tied to the three per se tests which follow,” even
when “otherwise the provision becomes an ambiguous standard that
can only be applied on a post hoc basis during the examination
178
process.”
A. An Attempt at Justifying the Facts and Circumstances Provision
The primary reason for the OCC’s decision to rely on regulation
by enforcement is to thwart those who would endeavor to find
loopholes around the combination rules. The OCC has declared that
it crafted the combination rules with an eye to “attempt[ing] to
eliminate many of the[] loopholes” that had previously permitted
179
banks and borrowers to circumvent the rule. The OCC sought to
prevent the combination rules from being underinclusive, as notice-

175. 12 U.S.C. § 93(b)(4).
176. Jordan, No. 2009-064, 2009 OCC Enf. Dec. LEXIS 68, at *1–4 (2009).
177. [Redacted], No. OCC AA-EC-88-17, 1989 OCC Enf. Dec. LEXIS 26, at *1 (1989).
178. [Redacted], OCC Interpretive Letter No. 563, O.C.C. Q.J., Mar. 1992, at 71, 71 (Sept. 6,
1991).
179. National Bank Lending Limits, 48 Fed. Reg. 15,844, 15,847 (Apr. 12, 1983) (codified in
scattered sections of 12 C.F.R.).
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and-comment rulemaking may be too slow to respond to those who
180
would exploit loopholes in the combination rules.
181
The avoidance of loopholes is a legitimate concern. Would-be
182
lawbreakers are creative, and neither a legislative body nor an
183
administrative agency can outsmart them quickly enough.
184
Regulations generally do not apply retroactively, and rulemaking is
185
a slow process. Even though courts often look with disfavor upon
186
the OCC may fear that these
crafty would-be lawbreakers,
lawbreakers could find ways to avoid the per se combination rules
187
and thereby avoid punishment.
180. See Pitt & Shapiro, supra note 14, at 156 (“[T]here are administrative benefits
to . . . regulation by enforcement. Among other things . . . the agency is able to react to specific
facts[] and tailor its responses to each new situation; [and] the agency is not required to conform
its actions to procedures that can . . . delay the articulation of new legal standards . . . .”).
181. See, e.g., Freeman United Coal Mining Co. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review
Comm’n, 108 F.3d 358, 362 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“[B]y requiring regulations to be too specific
[courts] would be opening up large loopholes allowing conduct which should be regulated to
escape regulation.” (second alteration in original) (quoting Ray Evers Welding Co. v.
Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 625 F.2d 726, 730 (6th Cir. 1980))); State v.
Wilchinski, 700 A.2d 1, 6 (Conn. 1997) (“[I]t is apparent that in many instances the uncertainty
[in a statute] is merely attributable to a desire not to nullify the purpose of the legislation by the
use of specific terms which would afford loopholes through which many could escape.” (quoting
WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 84–85 (1972)) (quotation marks
omitted)).
182. See, e.g., Judith Yates Borger, High Drama in the Courts: Bar Owners Try To Skirt
State’s Smoking Ban, MINN. POST (Apr. 28, 2008), http://www.minnpost.com/stories/2008/04/
28/1585/high_drama_in_the_courts_bar_owners_try_to_skirt_states_smoking_ban (describing
various attempts by bar owners to utilize loopholes in state smoking laws, including a Minnesota
bar’s attempt to label its patrons as actors to take advantage of an exception to a smoking ban
for theatrical performances).
183. See Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance of Law Is an Excuse—But Only for the Virtuous, 96
MICH. L. REV. 127, 138 (1997) (“Because the means by which bad people can invade the rights
of others are infinitely numerous and diverse, any attempt to specify them all by statute is
bound to be incomplete.”).
184. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (“Retroactivity is not
favored in the law. Thus . . . administrative rules will not be construed to have retroactive effect
unless their language requires this result.”).
185. Park, supra note 22, at 668.
186. When a court must rule either for someone who is sincerely trying to enforce a law or
someone who is deliberately and mischievously trying to circumvent the law, the court is
unlikely to rule for the latter. See, e.g., Taverns for Tots, Inc. v. City of Toledo, 307 F. Supp. 2d
933, 940–42 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (recognizing that the plaintiff, “a sham corporation,” ostensibly
qualified under an exemption to the Toledo smoking ordinance and that the court could not in
this case pierce the corporate veil, but nevertheless refusing to allow the plaintiff to benefit from
the exemption, “despite [the sham corporation’s] putative or even partially eleemosynary
purposes”).
187. See Albert C. Lin, Refining Fair Notice Doctrine: What Notice Is Required of Civil
Regulations?, 55 BAYLOR L. REV. 991, 1024 (2003) (“Writing a rule with greater specificity
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Due to the threat posed by loopholes, some regulations arguably
188
require regulation by enforcement to be successful. For instance,
Congress and the SEC have purposefully refused to codify a
189
definition of insider trading. When more than half of traders are
willing to admit that they would act upon an illegal tip if they could
190
avoid detection, the SEC’s use of regulation by enforcement to
prevent insider trading is “not astonishing” because it is trying to
191
attack an almost existential problem. For insider trading, regulation
by enforcement may arguably be necessary to deter traders who are
192
determined to find ways to circumvent the law. However, insider
trading is a special case. Whether regulation by enforcement is
appropriate for insider trading has little bearing on whether
regulation by enforcement is appropriate for the OCC.
B. Why Regulation by Enforcement Is Inappropriate for the
Combination Rules
At times, regulation by enforcement can perhaps be an
appropriate means of preventing the exploitation of loopholes, but it
must be fair to the regulated industry. For regulation by enforcement
to be fair, two characteristics must be present. First, the result of the
agency’s ad hoc decision must be based on an overarching principle

increases the risk of ‘loopholing,’ as regulated entities seek creative ways to skirt the law’s edges
without violating it. Regulatory vagueness, by making the outer edges of the law uncertain,
discourages regulated entities’ efforts to find loopholes in the law.” (footnotes omitted)).
188. See Park, supra note 22, at 681–88 (discussing when regulation by enforcement is
warranted).
189. See Ted Kamman & Rory T. Hood, With the Spotlight on the Financial Crisis,
Regulatory Loopholes, and Hedge Funds, How Should Hedge Funds Comply with the Insider
Trading Laws?, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 357, 398 (“The SEC, as well as Congress, seem to
have concluded that the definition of insider trading is better developed through the common
law approach of case-by-case decisions rather than through codification.”); Enactment of Insider
Trading Bill Unlikely This Year, SEC Official Says, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 323, 324
(1988) (“[House Energy and Commerce Committee Chairman] Dingell opposes legislation to
define insider trading because he believes it would narrow the SEC’s ability to bring
enforcement actions . . . .”).
190. See Roger Lowenstein, The Greed Police, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 25, 2011, at 36, 38
(“In a survey of 2,500 traders taken in 2007, more than half said they would take advantage of
an illegal tip if they were assured they wouldn’t be caught.”).
191. Kamman & Hood, supra note 189, at 398.
192. See Lowenstein, supra note 190, at 38 (“Though lawmakers have proposed legislation
codifying insider trading in the statutes, the S.E.C. seems to prefer a common-law approach, on
the theory that it will be a less fixed—thus a more worrisome—deterrent.”). But see generally
Pitt & Shapiro, supra note 14 (criticizing the SEC for relying on regulation by enforcement for
insider-trading cases).
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that is well-established so that the regulated industry may effectively
have had fair notice that it should not have pursued a given course of
193
action. Second, to justify regulation by enforcement, the public must
194
face significant harm as a result of the misconduct.
If the overarching principle motivating the combination rules is
not well-established, then regulation by enforcement is not justified,
because the regulated industry could not intuit that it should not have
195
issued the loans that it issued. The OCC has given scant guidance on
when it will deem a common enterprise to exist based on the facts and
circumstances of a given situation, and the motivating principle
behind the application of the facts-and-circumstances test is neither
intuitive nor well-established. The OCC’s only guidance has come in
the form of a thirteen-factor list—factors which may contribute
196
toward such a finding. These thirteen factors are broad and include
“engaging in supporting lines of business, interchange of goods and
services, . . . use of common facilities, . . . closely related business
activities, similarity in structure, . . . likelihood that a financially
troubled [borrower] would receive financial aid from [the other
197
borrower], [and] family relationships.”
Due to these factors’
breadth, a bank can know whether the OCC will utilize the catch-all
provision only if it first requests an interpretive letter. So long as none
of the three per se common-enterprise tests are met, a bank cannot
expect that a common enterprise exists. Because the principle behind
the facts-and-circumstances test is not well-established, the OCC
should not utilize regulation by enforcement.
Even if such a principle were well-established, the OCC should
not utilize regulation by enforcement because of the mismatch
between the public harm—the costs of bank failure—and the
proscribed violation—lending too much money to interrelated
borrowers. The express purpose of the lending-limit law is “to protect
the safety and soundness of national banks and savings associations
by preventing excessive loans to one person, or to related persons

193. Park, supra note 22, at 681.
194. Id. at 682.
195. See id. at 681–82 (“If the principle is novel, then fair notice concerns become more
significant and the conduct may be less likely to violate values on which there is societal
consensus. . . . If the misconduct causes significant public harm, the case for confronting such
wrongdoing with a principles-based enforcement action is stronger.”).
196. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
197. [Redacted], OCC Interpretive Letter No. 938, O.C.C. Q.J., Dec. 2002, at 31, 33 (Jan. 18,
2001).
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that are financially dependent, and to promote diversification of loans
198
and equitable access to banking services.” The lending-limit law
serves to diminish the risk that a bank may need to absorb a
substantial loan default, which could cause the bank to become
199
insolvent. The harm to the public from a bank violating the lendinglimit law is trivial unless the bank becomes insolvent as a result of the
excessive loans. If a bank has issued loans exceeding its lending limit,
but the borrowers have repaid those loans, then no harm has
occurred. Although the safety and soundness of the bank may have
been in jeopardy, the risk did not materialize. In contrast, if a bank
has issued loans exceeding its lending limit and the borrowers have
200
defaulted on those loans, then the bank must absorb the cost.
Bankers, not wishing for their banks to go insolvent, establish
201
reserves to absorb potential losses. These reserves typically exceed
202
bank equity by ten to fifteen times. Although a default on a loan
that exceeds a bank’s lending limit may consume a bank’s reserves
203
and render the bank insolvent, the bank’s reserves can provide a
cushion to prevent insolvency. If, despite this cushion, a bank does
become insolvent, then the cost to the government may be several
204
millions of dollars, as the government generally insures deposits up

198. 12 C.F.R. § 32.1(b) (2012). Although the goal of “diversification of loans and equitable
access” may sound like an equality concern, the OCC has made clear that it is concerned only
with the safety and soundness of the banks. See Lending Limits, 60 Fed. Reg. (Feb. 15, 1995)
(“The final rule . . . refocuses the lending limit rules on the areas of greatest safety and
soundness concern. The new rule enhances the ability of national banks to lend while protecting
against situations where excessive loans to a borrower or related borrowers present safety and
soundness concerns.”).
199. See Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Private Enforcement of Systemic Risk Regulation, 43
CREIGHTON L. REV. 993, 1010 (2010) (“Difficulty establishing a private cause of action stems
from the fact that limitations on lending were established to protect the solvency of the bank
rather than to protect an individual borrower.”).
200. Gay Hatfield & Carol Lancaster, The Signalling Effects of Bank Loan-Loss Reserve
Additions, J. FIN. & STRATEGIC DECISIONS, Spring 2000, at 57, 57.
201. Id.; see also OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF CURRENCY, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF
THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., NAT’L CREDIT UNION ADMIN. OFFICE OF
THRIFT SUPERVISION, INTERAGENCY POLICY STATEMENT ON THE ALLOWANCE FOR LOAN
AND LEASE LOSSES, 5–15, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/srletters/2006/
SR0617a1.pdf (describing how much capital a bank should have in its reserves).
202. James M. Wahlen, The Nature of Information in Commercial Bank Loan Loss
Disclosures, 69 ACCT. REV. 455, 455 (1994); see also Hatfield & Lancaster, supra note 200, at 57
(citing Wahlen, supra, at 455).
203. E.g., [Redacted], No. OCC AA-EC-88-17, 1989 OCC Enf. Dec. LEXIS 26, at *13–14
(1989).
204. Id.
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to $250,000 in the event of a bank collapse. Thus, lending-limit
violations can still spell insolvency for a bank, and that risk should not
206
207
be discounted. The financial harm to the public can be significant.
Yet regulation by enforcement is not the only way to prevent
banks from violating the spirit of the combination rules. The OCC
could draft more comprehensive combination rules by including
additional per se rules. The OCC has already announced the thirteen
factors that it considers to be relevant to an inquiry of whether the
facts and circumstances indicate that a common enterprise exists
208
between two borrowers. The OCC could transform some of these
factors into additional rules. For instance, the OCC could add a rule
209
that would aggregate loans made to spouses. The OCC could also
add a rule that would aggregate loans made to two borrowers who
210
share a centralized cash management system. Any such rule would
lessen the ability of banks to issue excessively risky loans without the
OCC needing to rely upon enforcement via the catch-all facts and
circumstances provision.
The OCC may have decided that the upfront costs necessary to
211
craft a more comprehensive regulation were not worth the expense,
205. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1)(E) (Supp. V 2012).
206. In 2007–2012, the estimated loss caused by all bank failures totaled almost $90 million.
Failures and Assistance Transactions, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://www2.fdic.gov/
hsob/SelectRpt.asp?EntryTyp=30 (last visited Mar. 28, 2013) (select “United States” and
“Other Areas” in the “State” field, “2007” and “2012” in the “Effective Date(s) field, and
“Detail” in the “Type of Report” field; then click “Produce Report”). The estimated loss is the
difference between the amount the FDIC disbursed from the Deposit Insurance Fund to cover
obligations to insured depositors and the amount estimated to be recovered or recoverable from
liquidating the receivership estate. Historical Statistics on Banking Help, FED. DEPOSIT INS.
CORP., http://www2.fdic.gov/hsob/help.asp#BF1EC (last visited Mar. 28, 2013).
207. The bailouts in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis led the U.S. government to spend
$2.5 trillion and to make $12.2 trillion in commitments to various institutions. Adding up the
Government’s Total Bailout Tab, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2009/02/04/business/20090205-bailout-totals-graphic.html.
208. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
209. Cf. supra note 141 and accompanying text (listing thirteen factors relevant to the “facts
and circumstances” provision).
210. See [Redacted], OCC Interpretive Letter No. 938, O.C.C. Q.J., Dec. 2002, at 31, 33
(Jan. 18, 2001) (listing the presence of a centralized cash-management program as a factor in
finding that the facts and circumstances warrant deeming a common enterprise to exist). A cashmanagement system is a cash depository that acts as a netting center and repository of surplus
funds, pooling the excess cash from each person and paying it to the other persons when they
experience a cash shortage. THUMMULURI SIDDAIAH, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
MANAGEMENT 313 (2010).
211. See Lin, supra note 187, at 1025 (“[S]ome vagueness in the law is tolerable because the
costs of eliminating vagueness may simply be too high. These costs include the direct cost
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especially considering how rarely the OCC uses the catch-all
212
provision. Yet rule-of-law values should not be sacrificed so easily.
Moreover, although drafting a more comprehensive regulation
213
more comprehensive
requires additional time and effort,
regulations may actually reduce enforcement costs for an agency by
decreasing the number of requests for interpretive letters that the
214
agency receives. Each interpretive letter that explains whether the
OCC will aggregate particular loans under the facts-andcircumstances provision costs the OCC time and money—costs that it
could largely have avoided incurring. The OCC has already revised
215
the combination rules five times in the past thirty years. Whatever
costs the OCC may incur in revising the combination rules do not
warrant the OCC’s decision to turn to regulation by enforcement as a
first resort. The OCC should take the time to identify what the law is.
CONCLUSION
216

Because of the facts-and-circumstances provision, banks are
unable to ascertain from a reading of the federal combination rules
whether the OCC will aggregate loans made to certain related
borrowers. Instead, they must either request an interpretive letter
from the OCC or risk the OCC later deciding to aggregate the loans.
As the regulation-by-enforcement critique shows, this ad hoc
217
“rulemaking” conflicts with rule-of-law values.
Regulation by enforcement is best reserved as an agency’s “last
218
resort.” The facts-and-circumstances provision is not justified by the
involved in formulating more detailed rules without uncertainty . . . .” (footnote omitted)); see
also Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 591
(1992) (discussing why an agency may craft a vague regulation).
212. See [Redacted], OCC Interpretive Letter No. 563, O.C.C. Q.J., Mar. 1992, at 71, 72
(Sept. 6, 1991) (“[W]e believe that instances where the facts and circumstances test will apply to
the exclusion of per se rules will be rare.”).
213. See supra note 211.
214. See Lin, supra note 187, at 1023 (“Clear rules reduce an agency’s enforcement costs by
making it easier for a regulated party to comply and for the agency to prove noncompliance.”).
215. Lending Limits, 60 Fed. Reg. (Feb. 15, 1995) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 32.5) (2013);
National Banks’ Lending Limit, 55 Fed. Reg. 854, 857 (Jan. 10, 1990) (codified at 12
C.F.R. § 32.5); OMB Control Numbers, 49 Fed. Reg. 11,824, 11,826 (Mar. 28, 1984) (codified in
scattered sections of 12 C.F.R.); National Bank Lending Limits, 48 Fed. Reg. 27,224, 27,225
(June 14, 1983) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 32.5); National Bank Lending Limits, 48 Fed. Reg.
15,844, 15,846 (Apr. 12, 1983) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 32.5).
216. 12 C.F.R. § 32.5(c)(4) (2012).
217. See supra Part III.B.
218. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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need to ensure the safety and soundness of banks; nevertheless, the
OCC has reserved for itself the ability “to flit serendipitously from
case to case, like a bee buzzing from flower to flower, making up the
219
rules as it goes along.” In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, sound
regulation of financial institutions is perhaps more needed than ever,
but the OCC has opted to treat lending limits like Calvinball,
“making up new rules on the fly to justify whatever [it], for some
220
reason, want[s].”
The OCC has already recognized once before, when it removed
the facts-and-circumstances provision from the direct-benefit test,
221
that it should use per se rules. The OCC should do so again by
removing the analogous facts-and-circumstances provision from the
common-enterprise test. If the OCC finds that the remaining per se
tests are insufficient to cover every situation in which loans should be
aggregated, then the OCC should add more per se tests.

219. Cf. supra note 1 and accompanying text.
220. Paul Krugman, Monetary Calvinball, N.Y. TIMES PAUL KRUGMAN BLOG (June 10,
2011, 12:17 PM), http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/10/monetary-calvinball.
221. See supra notes 156–159 and accompanying text.

